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UNITED STATES v. TIPTON, JOHNSON and ROANE
90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
After ajoint trial in the federal district court in Richmond, the jury
found that the defendants, Richard Tipton, Cory Johnson and James
Roane, had committed several murders in furtherance of a continuing
criminal enterprise (CCE), capital offenses under2l U.S.C.A. § 848,1 as
well as several related non-capital offenses, including conspiracy. The
government charged the defendants with operating a drug-trafficking
conspiracy based in the Richmond area. In the course of business, the
defendants, in various combinations, murdered ten people in early 1992.
The jury recommended the death penalty for each defendant under the
federal death penalty statute. The district court judge subsequently
ordered a stay of their deaths by lethal injection pending Congressional
authorization for a means of execution.
2
On direct appeal, the defendants raised almost sixty issues, most of
which were common to all. The prosecution cross-appealed, challenging
the trial court's order staying the executions.
3
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel rejected the defendants'
assignments of error with the exception of reversing the conspiracy
convictions as lesser included offenses of the continuing criminal enter-
prise element of capital murder. In addition, the court granted the
government's cross-appeal and vacated the trial court's order staying the
executions.4
1 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) provides in part:
(1) In addition to the other penalties set forth in this section-
(A) any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continu-
ing criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in an offense punishable
under section 841(b)(1)(A) of this title or section 960(b)(1) of this title
who intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or
causes the intentional killing of an individual and such killing results,
shall be sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less
than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be
sentenced to death...
2 United States v. Tipton, United States v. Johnson, United States
v. Roane, 90 F.3d 861, 869-70 (4th Cir. 1996).
3 Id. at 868.
4 Id. at 903.
5 Many of the court's rulings, however, will not be discussed in this
summary. The court rejected some of the defendants' assignments of
error in brief, conclusive language. Other assignments did not involve
death penalty law. On still others, the rulings provide little, if any,
guidance because they apply broad, settled principles of law to facts
specific to the case being reviewed. Issues in these categories include:
(1) discriminatory use of peremptory strikes against women;
(2) severance of conspiracies and related instructions; (3)
inadequacy of an indictment concerning a CCE charge; (4)
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
This case is the first direct appeal of a capital conviction in the
Fourth Circuit. Accordingly, discussion of the procedure employed and
issues decided on major components of the federal death penalty statute
will be somewhat lengthy.5
1. Pre-trial Issues
A. Defendants Were Not Present During Entire Voir Dire
The selection of jury members occurred in three stages. The court
first asked general questions to the jury pool about "non-sensitive" issues
such as ajuror's possible relation with a party in the case. This stage took
place in open court and the defendants were present. During the second
phase, the judge interviewed the remaining jurors individually about
"sensitive" subjects, including their ability to be effective jurors in light
of the capital charges. The judge performed this questioning in his
chambers with only counsel present. While defense counsel raised issues
concerning the defendants' absence at this phase, the record established
that they expressly waived defendants' right to be present. During the
final step, the court empaneled the jury after the parties exercised their
peremptory challenges. This stage occurred in open court with the
defendants present.6
Relying on their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to be present at
all critical stages of the trial and Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a), which grants a
prohibition against murders being used as predicate offenses
for a CCE charge; (5) instruction concerning emphasis that all
elements of CCE must be found separately for each defendant;
(6) amendment of jury instruction about supervision element
of CCE after defendant's closing argument; (7) judge's errant
use of "racketeering activity" when he should have said,
"enterprise engaged in racketeering activity"; (8) sufficiency
of the evidence for a finding of capital murder, (9) sufficiency
of evidence to demonstrate "substantial planning and premedi-
tation"; (10) facial challenges to the use of two non-statutory
aggravating factors-substantial criminal histories and par-
ticipation in a conspiracy having murder as a purpose; (11)
failure to define reasonable doubt in the capital-sentencing
instructions; (12) failure to hold the Government to penalty-
phase discovery and proof requirements; (13) failure to in-
struct on proper use of mental and neurological impairments
evidence; (14) failure to declare a mistrial because of a
prosecutor's comment on Tipton's failure to testify; and, (15)
failure to order a new penalty-phase trial because of the
Government's withdrawal of death-penalty notice against a
co-defendant.
6 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 871-872.
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right to be present at all stages of the voir dire, the defendants assigned
-rror for their absence during juror questioning in the judge's chambers.
Specifically, they argued that this right cannot be waived at a capital trial
jr, if it can, a formal written waiver is necessary.7 The court of appeals
reviewed this alleged error under the "plain error" standard of review set
nut in Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 8 Finding no prejudicial error under this
3tandard, the court did not reach the constitutional merits of the defen-
lants' objections.9
In conducting its "plain error" review of an alleged violation of a
rial right, the courtreliedheavily on United States v. Olano.10TheOlano
-ourt applied theRule 52(b) limitations to appellate review ofprocedurally
Forfeited assignments of error. In the instant case, defense counsels'
Failure to object during voir dire andpost-verdict resulted in the forfeiture
f an assignment of error based on the defendants' absence. The court of
ippeals explained that under Olano, a reviewing court has the authority
:o correct forfeited error "only if it is 'plain' and 'affects substantial
ights,' and even then is not required to do so unless the error is one that
'causes the conviction or sentencing of an actually innocent defendant'
)r otherwise 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputa-
ion of the judicial proceedings." ' 11 While conceding that any error
resulting from the defendants' absence would be "'plain' on the record,
he court stated that any such error did not "affect a substantial right."
'12
The court discussed three ways appellants can demonstrate how an
,rror may effect a substantial right. A defendant may either make a
;howing ofactual prejudice, invoke a presumption of prejudice where no
;howing can be made, or claim a substantial right was affected indepen-
lent of prejudice. 13 In this case, the court found that the defendants could
iot demonstrate actual prejudice - that is, that the absence affected the
)utcome of the trial. The court did acknowledge that it is almost
mpossible to make such a showing due to all the factors that result in a
-onviction. At a minimum, the defendant must show that a different jury
would have heard the case had the defendant been present during the voir
fire stage in question, but this showing would not itself suffice to make
)ut prejudice.14
The defendants also argued that the court of appeals should
)resume prejudice from their absence. While a total absence from all
,tages of voir dire may give sufficient grounds for a presumption, stated
he court, temporary absence was not prejudicial, especially so here
)ecause counsel was present at the in-chambers proceedings.
15
To some degree, the court has perhaps under-estimated the connec-
ion between the defendants' presence at voir dire and the composition
7 Id. at 870, 873.
8 Id. at 873. The jury selection process in federal court and the
'plain error" standard of review, represent differences between Virginia
practice and federal practice. In federal court, the trial judge does the
examination of the jurors after submission of questions by counsel. The
role of counsel is simply to move for ajuror's removal for cause, unless
the trial court allows limited participation. This procedure sharply
contrasts with Virginia practice where counsel plays an active role in
interviewing potential jurors.
9 Id. at 876. The court briefly discussed the merits of the defendants'
contentions.Id. at 873 nn.3-4. Citing Campbellv. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th
Cir. 1994), the court suggested that a defendant may waive his right to
presence during voir dire in a capital case. The court did not decide
whether a formal procedure isrequired to effect such a waiver. Id. at 873
n.3. Since this issue remains undecided, advocates should continue to
raise it on appeal and in habeas corpus petitions.
10 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
11 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 873-74 (citations omitted).
12 Id. at 874. Virginia, in effect, does not have a plain error rule and
the slightest failure to follow trial procedure results in findings of default
or waiver. See, e.g., Claget v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79,472 S.E.2d
263 (1996); summary of Claget, Capital Defense Journal, this issue;
of the jury. The defendants' presence likely affected the disposition and
answers of potential jurors when their responses concerned their ability
to sentence individuals to death who were present in court, or chambers,
with them. For this reason, it is probably better practice to ensure that a
defendant is present during every phase of jury selection. The question
as to whether a defendant may waive his right to be present at all remains
an open one in the Fourth Circuit.
Finally, the court held that absence from a portion of voir dire does
not curtail an absolute right that flows from "overarching systematic
reasons" such that prejudice need not be shown. 16 The court also found
that the "right to presence at all critical stages of trial ... is not such an
absolute, systemic right."1 7 The court furtherreasoned that a due process
argument suggesting a defendant was denied the opportunity to effec-
tively assist in his defense, while systemic in nature, requires a showing
of actual prejudice. 18 Because the defendants failed to show prejudice,
the court rejected their assignment of error pertaining to absences during
voir dire.19
B. The District Court Failed to Conduct Adequate Voir
Dire Regarding Racial Bias and Consideration of
Aggravating/Mitigating Factors in Sentencing
The trial court denied defense counsel's pre-trial motions to partici-
pate in voir dire questioning about racial prejudice. In response, counsel
submitted sixty-two proposed jury questions concerning racial bias. The
trial court did not accept these questions and instead asked, "Do you
harbor any bias or prejudice, racial or otherwise, that would prevent you
from being fair to the defendants in this case?" 20 Depending on ajuror's
response to this general question, the trial courtpermitted limited follow-
up questioning by counsel. The defendants claimed this single question
was insufficient for exposing racial bias, especially because the presiding
judge was himself a black person to whom jurors would be less inclined
to speak about their racial attitudes.
2 1
The court of appeals held that, given that the crime was not inter-
racial in nature (i.e.; motivated by racial hatred) and that the defendants
and victims were of the same race, the trial judge clearly had full
discretion over the formation and submission of race questions for voir
dire.22 The court did not, however, address whether the question was
effective in exposing racial attitudes. Instead, the court focused on the
trial judge's non-abuse of discretion in asking only one question.2 3 The
Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 464 S.E.2d 131 (1995); case
summary of Sheppard, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 2, pg. 9;
Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d 411 (1993); and
case summary of Beavers, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 26.
13 Id. at 874-76.
14 Id. at 876. Without deciding what would constitute prejudice,
the court of appeals indicated that, at minimum, a defendant would have
to show some bias on part of the current jurors selected. Id.
15 Id. at 875.
16 Id. at 874.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 874-75.
19 Id. at 876.
20 Id. at 877.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 877-78.
23 Id. at 878-89. The court refused to consider the sufficiency of
the voirdire question in light of the trialjudge's race. The court observed
that to hold thatjurors might tailor their responses because the trial judge
was a member of a minority class would adopt an "unthinkable" per se
rule as a matter of policy. Id. at 879 n.8.
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court did not consider the apparent intent of the framers of the federal
CCE statute to eliminate racial prejudice in capital trials. For example,
the statute requires that the jury be instructed not to impose a death
sentence "unless it has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of
death for the crime in question no matter what the race [or] color... of
the defendant or the victim, may be." 24
Notwithstanding the court's ruling, many times judges recognize
the real effect ofrace in capital trials and will permitmeaningful voir dire
on the issue. Counsel should continue to urge them to do so. Counsel in
this case recognized the importance of the context in which a question is
posed to its ability to expose bias. It is not unreasonable to suspect ajuror
is perhaps less likely to reveal racial attitudes to a black trial judge. The
extent of questioning about race should not be determined only by the
context of the crime, but should also take into account the context of the
courtroom.
When conducting voir dire concerning the prospective jurors'
willingness to consider mitigating factors specifically relevant to the
case, the trial judge again declined to incorporate suggested questions
submitted by defense counsel and refused to allow counsel to participate
in questioning.25 The trial court posed a single question: "Do you have
strong feelings in favor of the death penalty?"'26 If the juror gave any
answer other than "no," the court then asked whether the juror "would
always vote to impose the death penalty in every case where a defendant
was found guilty of a capital offense."'27 The court of appeals held that
this line of questioning was a proper exercise of discretion.
28
In finding no error, the court improperly characterized the holding
of the United States Supreme Court in Morgan v. Illinois.29 The court
interpreted Morgan as holding only that the Sixth Amendment grants the
right to ensure "a jury none of whose members would 'unwaveringly
impose death after a finding of guilt' and hence would uniformly reject
any and all evidence of mitigating factors, no matter how instructed on
the law."'30 In essence, the court read Morgan narrowly to mean that by
granting defendants the right to eliminate unequivocally pro-death
penalty jurors, defendants will necessarily eliminate those who will not
consider mitigating factors. However, the entitlement under Morgan is
much broader. Under Morgan, the defendant is not limited to asking
whether the juror would always impose a death sentence. Instead, the
defendant is allowed to ask questions about how the juror's attitudes
concerning the death penalty affect his or her fitness to sit and whether
a juror could consider mitigating evidence.
31
The Supreme Court framed the important Sixth Amendment issue
concerning voir dire questioning about a juror's opinions on the death
penalty'in Wainwright v. Witt.32 In Witt, the Supreme Court stated that
the proper standard for the excluding ajuror for cause is whether ajuror's
attitude for or against the death penalty would "prevent or substantially
24 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1).
25 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 878.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 879.
29 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
30 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 878.
31 Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728 (citations omitted).
32 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
33 Id. at 424.
34 See, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978)(holding that a statute
is incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments that pre-
vents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigat-
ing weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to
circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation and that creates the
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath."'33 Inquiries about the influence of a juror's
opinions in favor of the death penalty on his or her ability to sit are best
characterized as "reverse-Witt" questions. That is, a pro-death penalty
attitude that would substantially impair the ability of a prospective juror
to follow the law is also disqualifying. In order to follow the law, capital
jurors must consider as a mitigating factor any aspect of the defendant's
character or history, as well as circumstances of the offense, proffered as
a basis for a sentence less than death. 34 Therefore, any potential juror
who would not at least consider some particular mitigating factors would
not be qualified to serve.
The questions asked by the trial court were inadequate for examin-
ing a juror's opinions about the death penalty. The questions merely
revealed if ajuror had an opinion against the death penalty. They did not
explore how that opinion might influence the juror's ability to perform
his or her duties. This situation was exacerbated by the disparate
treatment of those who expressed reservations toward the death penalty.
The trial court allowed extensive questioning of jurors who expressed
hesitation towards a death sentence, but did not allow such questioning
for those who expressed no discomfort.35 With these hesitant jurors, the
court recognized that their opinion could prevent or substantially impair
the performance of their duties as jurors.36 This disparity in treatment of
jurors raises issues of fundamental fairness at the trial level.
In addition to alerting trial judges to the correct interpretations of
Morgan and Witt, Tipton suggests defense counsel should make a record
of her efforts to obtain meaningful voir dire to preserve the issue of a
prospective juror's inability to consider mitigation evidence generally,
as well as to specific factors that will be proffered by the defense.
Preparing such a record is essential to preserve the issue for eventual
determination by the United States Supreme Court.
II. Guilt Phase Issues
A. Conviction of Capital Murder in the Commission of a
Continuing Criminal Enterprise
The jury found the defendants had committed several capital
murders while furthering a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) as
defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848. 37 Each defendant received a death sentence
for at least one conviction of capital murder.
38
A person engages in a CCE if he (1) commits a drug related felony
which (2) is part of a continuing series of violations that (a) are
undertaken in concert with five or more other persons where the defen-
dant is an organizer or holds another such management position, and (b)
receives substantial income or resources.39 Section 848(e) provides that
risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may
call for a less severe penalty); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982)(holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider, as a matter
of law, any relevant mitigating evidence); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989)(finding that the jury is not provided with a vehicle for
expressing reasoned moral response when there are no jury instructions
informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to the mitigating
evidence).
35 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 880-81 (citations omitted).
36 Id.
37 Forfurther analysis of2l U.S.C. § 848, see O'Grady, WhatEvery
Virginia CapitalDefenseAttorneyShouldKnowAbouttheFederalDrug
Kingpin Statute, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 40 (1993).
38 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 867-68.
39 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(c).
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any person working in furtherance of a CCE who intentionally kills or
commands the killing of an individual may be sentenced to death.
On the basis of § 848(e), the trial court fashioned a three part jury
instruction concerning capital murder as part of a CCE. To return a
conviction of capital murder, the trial court instructed the jury that it had
to find: (1) "that the defendant was engaged in or working in furtherance
of a CCE," (2) "that while so engaged, the defendant either intentionally
killed or counseled the intentional killing of an individual" and (3) "that
the killing actually resulted." 40 The defendants argued that this instruc-
tion allowed a juror to impermissibly find guilt on the basis of temporal
coincidence of a murder with a CCE without finding a substantive
connection between them. The court seemed to agree with the defense
that a substantive connection must be found.41 Although this interpreta-
tion is not plain on the face of the statute, it certainly makes sense, and
the court's holding is encouraging in this respect. In fashioning this
requirement, the court has provided some precedent to support a poten-
tial jury instruction or assignment of error based upon the requirement of
a substantive connection between a murder in the furtherance of a CCE.
In the instant case, the court rejected the defendants' claim, finding that
the trial evidence and the government's closing arguments eliminated
any possibility that the jury would fall to find a substantive connection.42
In addition, defense counsel should note that prosecutors will supply
ample evidence about drug activities in the belief that such evidence will
make a death sentence more likely.
B. Government's Impeding of Timely and Effective Access
to Witnesses Under Government Protection
When the prosecution submitted its list of witnesses, it omitted the
addresses of witnesses who were in the federal protection program. The
trial court then arranged for the defense to interview the witnesses, but
the prosecution advised these witnesses that they were not obligated to
meet with the defense. In response, counsel for the defendants filed a
motion for further court supervision. The trial court denied this motion
and found that the defendants only had a right of access to the witnesses,
but not a right that compelled the witnesses to submit to an interview.
43
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that only access was
constitutionally protected. The court of appeals held that the prosecutor's
advice to the witnesses did notviolate the defendants' constitutional right
to confrontation. The court further held that the withholding of the
witnesses' addresses, while a technical violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3432,
44
was justified because the threat of violence was "palpable."45 To obtain
40 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 887.
41 Id. While the court made no express statement that a jury must
find a causal connection between the murder and the CCE, the court did
state that the defendants' contention that the instructions allowed the jury
to find only temporal relation, would be a "serious one" if there were no
other instructions. The court made a great effort to demonstrate how a
jury could not have overlooked the need for a substantive connection by
looking at the context of the jury instructions as a whole. Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 889.
44 18 U.S.C. § 3432 provides:
A person charged with treason or other capital offense shall at
least three entire days before commencement of trial be
furnished with a copy of the indictment and a list of the
veniremen, and of the witnesses to be produced on the trial for
proving the indictment, stating the place of abode of each
venireman and witness, except that such list of the veniremen
judicial relief for this error, the defendants would have to make a showing
of actual prejudice.
4 6
The trial court also refused to allow defense counsel to cross-
examine the witnesses about their unwillingness to submit to an inter-
view. The court of appeals held that this restriction was well within the
discretion of the trial court and that the motives and biases of the
witnesses were exposed on cross-examination.
47
The court's opinions on these issues reflect the difficulty of
practicing in federal court when a prosecution witness is within the
witness protection program. Judges appear to be very tolerant of late
access and shielding techniques so long as they draw"on the spirit" of the
program. Defense counsel have limited options when faced with these
difficulties. Counsel for the defense can remind the court that the
prosecutor does not represent the witnesses and it is unethical to instruct
them not to talk with defense counsel. 48 Defense counsel should also
move for disclosure of addresses in camera. To facilitate getting access
to the witnesses, counsel may want to inform the court that a continuance
may be required if access is not timely provided. If the court grants access
mid-trial and there is a need to follow-up on information gleaned from an
interview with a witness, defense counsel should move for a continuance.
The record should reflect that the motion was grounded upon the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him
and his right to counsel.
C. Conspiracy as a Lesser Included Offense of CCE
Finally, the court held that a § 846 conspiracy is a lesser included
offense of a § 848 CCE and vacated the conspiracy convictions in this
case.49 This holding suggests that where the evidence tends to show an
overlap between the CCE and a conspiracy charge, counsel may move to
dismiss the conspiracy. This tactic requires that defense counsel make a
pre-trial effort to discover what evidence the prosecution intends to
introduce for the purpose of establishing a CCE. This inquiry may be
accomplished by a Bill of Particulars.
III. Penalty Phase Issues
A. Failure to Sever Trials for Sentencing
The trial judge denied multiple defense motions to sever the trials
in the penalty phase. On appeal, defense counsel argued that a joint trial
reduced individualized consideration of aggravating and mitigating
and witnesses need not be furnished if the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that providing the list may/
jeopardize the life or safety of any person.
45 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 889. The court of appeals also refused to
provide defense counsel with addresses in camera. Proceeding in camera
would appear to protect a defendant's right to prepare a defense and also
address concerns about the safety of witnesses, unless the court simply
distrusts one of its officers.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(a) and (f).
49 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 891. At this stage, of course, the government
had already reaped at trial the evidentiary benefits that come with a
conspiracy allegation. See, e.g., UnitedStates v.Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171
(1987) (holding hearsay declarations of alleged co-conspirators admis-
sible before conspiracy established).
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factors. The courtrejected this argument and noted that the trialjudge had
the discretion to bifurcate the trial. Under the relevant standard of review
for abuse of discretion, the trial judge's discretion to bifurcate the trial
needs to be constitutionally "constrained at its outerlimits" 50 only in that
the choice does notdeny individualized consideration of each defendant's
culpability as required by Gregg v. Georgia.51 The court of appeals held
there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge because § 848(i)(1)(a)
dictates that the guilt-stage jury will hear the penalty trial. Severance
wouldhave required three separate, and mostly repetitious, penalty trials.
Such trials would be unwarranted in light of the policy considerations of
efficiency and fairness to the prosecution. In addition, the court of
appeals found that the trial court's frequent instructions, reprimands of
the prosecutor, and distribution of separate sentencing packets for each
defendant, eliminated any potential risk of unfairness to the defen-
dants. 52
Combined penalty-phase trials are a serious issue in capital defense
cases because they impair the jury's ability to consider separate mitigat-
ing and aggravating factors pertaining to an individual defendant. In
addition, combined penalty trials hinder the lawyers' ability to empha-
size differences in culpability among the defendants themselves and
differences with other persons sentenced to death. Therefore, defense
counsel should vigorously resistjoining defendants for the penalty stage.
B. Challenges to Sentencing Under § 848
If the jury convicts a defendant of a violation of § 848(e), the jury
may sentence him to death.53 Sections 8480) and 848(k) establish the
sentencing procedure. In considering aggravating factors, the jury must
first unanimously find that one circumstance under § 848(n)(1) exists.
54
The (n)(1) factors describe requisite mental states for capital murder.
Failure to find a an (n)(1) factor ends the death-sentencing procedure and
eliminates the possibility of death. After unanimously finding an (n)(1)
circumstance, the jury must also unanimously find another aggravating
factor among those listed in § 848(n)(2)-(12). If the jury cannot identify
such a factor, the sentencing process ends and the death penalty is
eliminated. The jury may also consider non-statutory aggravating factors
if the prosecution has provided sufficient written notice under §
848(h)(1)(B). The jury weighs these aggravating factors against statu-
tory mitigating factors listed in § 848(m) and other non-statutory mitigat-
ing factors. An individual juror may find a mitigating factor indepen-
dently of the other jurors. After the weighing process, the jury must
unanimously agree to a death sentence or may elect to recommend
another, non-death sentence.55
Section 848(m) contains additional statutory mitigating factors
that are not listed in § 19.2-264.4 of the Virginia Code. These include:
being under substantial or unusual duress, playing a relatively minor role
as a principal, not having reasonably foreseen that death would result
50 Id. at 892.
51 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
52 Tipton, at 892-93.
53 21 U.S.C. § 848(e).
54 21 U.S.C. § 848(k). Subsection (n)(1) states:
(1) The defendant-
(A) intentionally killed the victim;
(B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury which
resulted in the death of the victim;
(C) intentionally engaged in conduct intending that the
victim be killed or that lethal force be employed
against the victim, which resulted in the death of the
victim;
(D) intentionally engaged in conduct which-
from the actions, and that an existing equally culpable defendant will not
receive a death sentence.
56
1. Allowance of Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors
Defendants made facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to
the sentencing procedure under § 848. They alleged on appeal that the §
848 sentencing provisions, § 848(h)(l)(B) and § 848(j) and (k), are
facially unconstitutional in that they permit a jury to consider non-
statutory aggravating factors. Specifically, defendants contended that
Congress violated the separation of powers principles in delegating
authority to prosecutors to introduce such factors for consideration in
sentencing. 57 In other words, Congress cannot decline to delegate the
authority to determine what aggravating factors a jury can consider for
a death sentence. The court dismissed this challenge in a cursory manner.
The court held that any delegation involved was "sufficiently circum-
scribed" by "intelligible principles" to avoid violating the separation of
powers principles.
58
2. Vagueness of "Substantial Planning" and
"Premeditation"
The defendants also claimed that the (n)(8) aggravating factor
listed in § 848(n)(8)-that the "the defendant committed the offense after
substantialplanning andpremeditation"-is unconstitutionally vague.59
Specifically, the defendants alleged that "substantial" as a modifier of
"planning" is not sufficiently precise in meaning to serve the discretion-
channeling function that is constitutionally required for applying eligi-
bility factors in capital sentencing. 60 Because counsel did not raise this
objection until appeal, the court reviewed the claim for plain error under
the stringent definition of Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 as interpreted in Olano.
61
The Court of Appeals held:
We are therefore satisfied that the (n)(8) aggravating factor's
use of the word "substantial" to modify "planning and pre-
meditation" .., conveys with adequate precision a commonly
understood meaning of "considerable," or "more than merely
adequate," thereby ensuring that the (n)(8) factor served suf-
ficiently to channelthejury's discretion in assessing eligibility
for the death sentence.62
The court argued that the jury must have understood "substantial
planning and premeditation" to mean "more than the minimum amount
sufficient to commit the crime."'63 In an appropriate case, defense
counsel may prepare a proposed jury instruction containing this ap-
proved definition of "substantial."
(i) the defendant knew would create a grave risk of
death to a person, other than one of the participants
in the offense; and
(ii)resulted in the death of the victim.
55 21 U.S.C. § 848(k).
56 21 U.S.C. Section 848(m)(2)-(4) and (8).
57 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 895.
58 Id. See also,Loving v. UnitedStates, 116 S.Ct. 1737 (1996), and
case summary of Loving, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 895. See supra Part I.A.
62 Id. at 896.
63 Id.
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3. The (n)(1) Aggravating Factors Fail to Guide
Sentencing Discretion.
Defendants alleged that the circumstances within the § 848(n)(1)
aggravating factor fail to guide and channel the sentencing discretion of
the jury in imposing the death penalty, as is constitutionally required.
Specifically, they argued that every capital murder contains a circum-
stance or mental state that can be found among the several circumstances
listed in (n)(1). As a result, ajury could assign an (n)(1) circumstance in
every case of capital murder. Therefore, the (n)(1) aggravating factor
fails to provide a standard by which juries can determine those capital
offenses in which the death penalty is warranted and those in which it is
not.64
While the court admitted that the four (n)(1) factors essentially
replicate the mental states for constitutional death sentence eligibility,
the court ruled that they reflect four distinctly different levels of moral
culpability. 65 Quoting Arave v. Creech,66 the court agreed that "'the
degree of culpability, as measured by specific mental states, is a proper
basis for making death penalty choices among murderers."' 67 The court
stated that in requiring juries to find one of these circumstances, (n)(1)
"precisely provides" the principled basis for identifying those murderers
"deserving of death," as the Constitution requires. 68 For example, the
court suggested these factors help to morally differentiate intentional
homicides from murders-for-hire.
69
The court of appeals' position is somewhat disingenuous in that it
ignores the fact that, under the guidance of (n)(1), the jury does not
distinguish among mental states or degrees of culpability. The jury
simply identifies one element among the list, which includes all mental
states for capital murder and thereby all degrees of culpability. The jury
does not engage in any comparison among the list. It makes little
difference if thejury finds the lowest degree of culpability or the highest;
either will result in the finding of the (n)(1) aggravating factor. Further,
the court has not provided an explanation of exactly how mental states
relate to degrees of moral culpability.
4. Jury Needs to Find Only One Aggravating Factor
Under § 848(n)(1)
The defendants additionally alleged that the § 848(n)(1) factor was
unconstitutionally applied to each of them when the trial court, over
defense objections, allowed the jury to find more than one of the (n)(1)
specific circumstances as a basis for determining the existence of the
(n)(1) aggravating factor.70 The trial court's allowance of such an
accumulation of circumstances, the defense argued, "unconstitutionally
skewed" the weighing process in favor of death.71 Following the Court
ofAppeals fortheTenth Circuit's holding in United States v. McCullah
7 2
64 Id. at 898.
65 Id at 897-98. See supra at n.55.
66 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
67 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 898 (citations omitted).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 898-99.
71 Id. at 899.
72 United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d. 1087 (10th Cir. 1996).
73 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 899.
74 Id. (citations omitted).
75 Id.
76 Id.
the court accepted the defense's contention. 73 The court stated:
To allow cumulative findings of these intended alternative
circumstances, all of which do involve different forms of
criminal intent, runs a clear risk of skewing the weighing
process in favor of the death penalty and thereby causing it to
be imposed arbitrarily, hence unconstitutionally.
74
According to the court, the submission of instructions by the trial court
permitting cumulative findings of more than one of the (n)(1) circum-
stances as an aggravating factor was a constitutional error.
75
The court held, however, that the error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."76 The court concluded that the jury, even if properly
instructed, would have reached the same outcome; therefore, the error
was harmless. The combination of circumstances, the court observed,
might have prejudiced the defendants if it gave a single factor, mental
state, a four-fold effect in weight or "it allowed the jury to find a more
morally culpable circumstance than was supported" by the evidence
before it.77 Yet, the court held that no prejudice existed because thejury,
under proper instructions, would have found § 848(A), intentional
killing, as the sole basis for its (n)(1) finding and no other less culpable
circumstance.78 The fact that the jury only recommended the death
sentence with respect to those murders where a defendant was the actual
killer or was a participant in the killing, suggested the jury only found the
§ 848(A) circumstance. A multiplier effect did not exist because each of
the other three (n)(1) circumstances are "necessarily subsumed as merely
a 'lesser-included' aspect of the (A) ... circumstance." 79 In addition, the
trial court's instructions emphasizing the impropriety of quantitative
weighing and the overlapping "lesser-included" relationship between
the § 848(A) and (D) circumstances, eliminated any possible prejudice
resulting from the cumulative weighing of circumstances. From this
instruction, the court reasoned that the jury properly did not weigh an
aggregate of § 848(n)(1) circumstances.
80
The court's holding on this issue suggests counsel should ensure
that the jury is instructed that the sentence of death is eliminated if no
(n)(1) component is found. In addition, the instruction should inform the
jury that once they have identified one (n)(1) component they have
satisfied (n)(1), and must cease consideration of other components.
81
The court's language also serves as a reminder to parties that a
jury's consideration of § 848(n)(1) components is confined to those
components which the guilt-trial evidence supports. The court noted that
there is potential prejudicial error "if ajury was permitted to consider and
to find the § 848(A) circumstance when the guilt-phase evidence sufficed
only to convict a defendant as a marginal aider and abettor who did not
participate directly in the killing.' 82 In light of this language, defense
counsel should, by objection or motions in limine, limit the findings of
the (n)(1) circumstances to those supported by the guilt-phase evidence.
77 Id. at 900.
78 Id.
79 Id. The court also contended thatLowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.
231 (1988), foreclosed claims of "impermissible duplication." 90 F.3d
898 n.19.
80 Id. at 900-01.
81 See also, United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073 (1 1th Cir.
1993); UnitedStates v. Pitera, 795 F.Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y 1992); United
States v. Pretlow, 779 F.Supp 758 (D.N.J 1991). The court interprets
these cases to suggest that only one (n)(1) circumstance should be found.
Tipton, 90 F.3d at 898 n.23.
82 Id. at 900 n.23.
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E. Attorney General May Authorize Lethal Injections
At the time the jury imposed the death sentences, no federal statute
provided authorization for the "specific means of executing such sen-
tences."'83 Yet, the Attorney General of the United States had promul-
gated regulations that death sentences imposed under § 848(e) should be
executed "by intravenous injection of a lethal substance or substances in
a quantity sufficient to cause death."84 The trial court stayed the execu-
tion on the grounds that the Attorney General's regulation was ultra vires
because Congress possessed the exclusive power to prescribe the means
83 Id. at 901-902.
84 Id. at 902 (citations omitted).
by which federal death sentences should be carried out. The court
rejected this argument, stating that Congress's power was not exclusive
and that Congress had not preempted the issue, expressly or impliedly.
85
In addition, the court held that application of the regulation to the
defendants did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it was
promulgated after the commission of the capital offenses at issue.
86
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85 Id. at 902-903.
86 Id. at 903.
BARNABEI v. COMMONWEALTH
1996 WL 517733 (Va. 1996)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Derek Rocco Bamabei was indicted for rape1 and for capital murder
in the commission of a rape.2 At trial, the Commonwealth introduced
items of circumstantial evidence and various forensic tests tending to
show that on the night of the murder, (1) the victim was with the
defendant in the defendant's room, (2) the defendant and the victim had
sexual intercourse, and (3) the victim was killed in defendant's room
before her body was found in the river.3 The sole witness to offer any
evidence from which the jury could infer that a rape occurred was the
Commonwealth's medical examiner. Although Bamabei had moved
pre-trial for the appointment of a forensic pathologist to assist the
defense, the trial court denied Barnabei's motion.4 The jury found the
defendant guilty of both rape and capital murder.
5
At the sentencing phase, Bamabei's ex-wife was one of two
witnesses to testify for the Commonwealth about various threats and acts
of violence that Bamabei had allegedly inflicted upon her. Barnabei
objected to her testimony as to specific incidents, arguing that such
testimony went beyond the scope of the notice given by the Common-
wealth pursuant to Va. Code § 19.2-264.3:2.6 The trial court overruled
1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-61(A).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5).
3 Barnabeiv. Commonwealth, 1996 WL517733, *1-*4 (Va. 1996).
4 Id. at *5.
5 Id. at*1.
6 § 19.2-264.3:2 provides that if the Commonwealth intends to
introduce evidence of any unadjudicated acts allegedly attributable to the
defendant, the Commonwealth must provide pre-trial notice to the
defendant of such intention, including a description of the unadjudicated
acts.
7 Barnabei, 1996 WL 517733 at *11.
8 Id. at*l.
9 Id. at *5.
10 The court rejected all of defendant's assignments of error. Some
of the rulings provide little if any guidance because they apply broad,
settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case being
Bamabei's objection and his motion for a mistrial and admitted further
testimony from his ex-wife.7 At the close of the evidence, the jury
sentenced Bamabei to death based upon both the "vileness" and "future
dangerousness" predicates. 8
Barnabei appealed his capital murder conviction and death sen-
tence, challenging, among other things, the trial court's refusal to appoint
a defense forensic expert and the admission of a portion of his ex-wife's
testimony. 9
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected both of Bamabei's chal-
lenges. In upholding the trial court's refusal to appoint a defense forensic
pathologist expert, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Bamabei
failed to make the necessary particularized showing that would have
entitled him to such an expert. The court upheld the admission of the
testimony of Bamabei's ex-wife, ruling that the notice given by the
Commonwealth pursuant to § 19.2-264.3:2 was sufficient and that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.
10
reviewed. Issues that will not be addressed in this summary include:
(1) harmlessness of prosecution error in withholding exculpatory
evidence; (2) removal of two jurors for cause by the Commonwealth; (3)
denial of defendant's proposed jury instructions on mitigating factors
and sentence alternatives; and (4) statutory review of imposition of death
sentence.
The court also rejected Barnabei's claim that the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury that he would not be eligible for parole for at
least 25 years. However, it is important to note that defense counsel
preserved this type of claim pursuant to Simmons v. South Carolina, 114
S. Ct. 2187 (1994). For treatment of the implications of Simmons, see
Pohl and Turner, If at First You Don't Succeed: The Real and Potential
Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 28 (1994).
